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Abstract—Adversarial examples are augmented data points
generated by imperceptible perturbation of input samples. They
have recently drawn much attention with the machine learning
and data mining community. Being difficult to distinguish from
real examples, such adversarial examples could change the
prediction of many of the best learning models including the
state-of-the-art deep learning models. Recent attempts have been
made to build robust models that take into account adversarial
examples. However, these methods can either lead to performance
drops or lack mathematical motivations. In this paper, we propose
a unified framework to build robust machine learning models
against adversarial examples. More specifically, using the unified
framework, we develop a family of gradient regularization meth-
ods that effectively penalize the gradient of loss function w.r.t.
inputs. Our proposed framework is appealing in that it offers a
unified view to deal with adversarial examples. It incorporates
another recently-proposed perturbation based approach as a
special case. In addition, we present some visual effects that
reveals semantic meaning in those perturbations, and thus sup-
port our regularization method and provide another explanation
for generalizability of adversarial examples. By applying this
technique to Maxout networks, we conduct a series of experiments
and achieve encouraging results on two benchmark datasets. In
particular,we attain the best accuracy on MNIST data (without
data augmentation) and competitive performance on CIFAR-10
data.
Keywords—Adversarial examples; Deep learning; Regulariza-
tion; Robust classification
I. INTRODUCTION
Imperceptible perturbations in images are able to change
the prediction of neural network models, including single layer
softmax model [1], [2], [3]. That is, given a trained neural
network model and an input image, one can always find a
small perturbation that can change the model’s predication
through certain optimization procedure. Moreover, perturba-
tions trained in one model could also change the prediction
results of many other classification models. The examples
constructed by using such perturbations are referred to as
adversarial examples, which have attracted much interest in
both machine learning and data mining [2], [4], [5].
The existence of adversarial examples raises several impor-
tant issues. First, why do such perturbations exist in the first
place? Intuitively, a successful machine learning model should
robustly classify indistinguishable inputs as the same class. The
generalizability of those perturbations is even more intriguing,
since those perturbations are obtained by optimization process
based on model and image instance. Second, why do such
perturbations not occur frequently in real applications (i.e.,
naturally generated data)? Indeed, if most examples are ad-
versarial examples, no machine learning algorithm could work
at all. Finally and most importantly, what can we do to deal
with adversarial examples? One possibility is to build machine
learning models that are immune to adversarial examples.
Alternatively, we might be able to use adversarial examples
to even improve the performance of most machine learning
models.
To explain the existence of adversarial examples, [2] argued
that this particular phenomenon could arise naturally from high
dimensional linearity, as opposite to nonlinearity suspected
by [1]. [6] showed that models’ robustness against adversarial
examples are limited by distinguishability between classes.
This also supports that nonlinearity is not the fundamental
reason behind adversarial examples. They also argued the
generalizability of adversarial examples is due to neural net-
work models’ resemblance of linear classifiers. In addition to
directly addressing the problem, [3] have discovered a twin
problem: there exist human unrecognizable images, which
deep learning models could classify them with high confi-
dence. There is not yet a verifiable answer to why adversarial
examples exist only infrequently in real-life cases, but some
speculate that they appear only in low probability regions in
data manifolds [1], [2]. To alleviate the influence caused by
adversarial examples, [7] tried to penalize the Jacobian matrix
based on a series of approximations. While their model seems
more robust, it usually leads to an accuracy drop and slow
training due to additional cost. Accuracy can be improved
by injecting those perturbed examples back in training, as
demonstrated by [1]. [2] have further extended this idea to
the so-called fast gradient sign method, and when using this
method, trained models are more robust against adversarial
examples. While this method seems promising, it appears to
lack mathematical motivation and failing to fully utilize the
idea of linear perturbation as a consequence. In data mining
community, researchers also try to build models that are
robust against adversarial examples (adversarial attacks) [4],
[5]. In particular, a study investigated correspondence between
adversarial examples and effective regularizer, but their results
are restricted merely for some specific loss functions [4].
We develop the linear view of adversarial examples pro-This work has been presented at ICDM 2015 as a regular paper.
posed by [2] in a more rigorous and unified way. To this
end, we propose a unified framework to train models that
is robust to adversarial examples and successfully transform
it to a minmax problem. Specifically, we propose a family
of gradient based perturbations, as a unified regularization
technique. Models trained by applying our proposed gradient
regularization family have proved highly robust to perturba-
tions. Moreover, under different values of norm parameter, the
family presents itself a unified framework, i.e.- it incorporates
the recently-proposed fast gradient sign method [2] as a special
case and can also derive many other more promising methods.
One interesting special case is verified to achieve encouraging
performance in two benchmark data sets. Furthermore, by
magnifying perturbations in MNIST [8], we could provide
physical intuition for why adversarial examples could be
generalized across different machine learning models.
II. GRADIENT REGULARIZATION FAMILY
In this section, we will present our framework of gradient
regularization family and describe its theoretical properties.
A. General Framework
We introduce our framework by starting with the worst-
case perturbation, initially proposed in [2]. One salient feature
of our framework is that it can represent a significant extension
to the previous work into a unified family that incorporates
many important variants of gradient regularization technique.
Denote L(x; θ) 1 as a loss function, x as data, and θ as
model parameters. The idea could be formalized as follows.
Instead of solving minθ L(x; θ), ideally we would like to solve
the following problem if we try to build a robust model against
any small perturbation defined as ǫ:
min
θ
max
ǫ:‖ǫ‖
p
≤σ
L(x+ ǫ; θ) (1)
The norm constraint in the inner problem implies that we
only require our model to be robust against certain small
perturbation. Thus the training procedure is decomposed into
two stages. We first find a perturbation that maximizes the loss
given the data and constraints. Then, we perform our ordinary
training procedure to minimize the loss function by altering
θ. In general, this problem is difficult to be solved due to its
non-convex nature with respect to ǫ and θ.
In the following, we will propose to solve the problem us-
ing approximation technique. To this end, we first approximate
the loss function by its first order Taylor expansion at point x.
The inner problem then becomes:
max
ǫ
L(x) +∇xLT ǫ s.t. ‖ǫ‖p ≤ σ (2)
This problem is trivially linear, and hence convex w.r.t. ǫ. We
can obtain a closed form solution by Lagrangian multiplier
method, see A for details. This yields:
ǫ = σ sign(∇L)( |∇L|‖∇L‖p∗
)
1
p−1 (3)
where p∗ is the dual of p, i.e., 1
p∗
+ 1
p
= 1.
1This notation might be shorthanded as L(x) or L in the following text.
If we substitute the optimal ǫ back to the original optimiza-
tion problem, we can see that the influence of perturbations can
be formulated as a regularization term. Thus, the new family
of regularization method works approximately as:
min
θ
L(x) + σ ‖∇xL‖p∗ (4)
Instead of minimizing L(x), we try to minimize L(x + ǫ)
where ǫ is defined above, and parameterized by p such that
the new optimization objective could be highly robust to any
small perturbations.
Remark 1. It is worthwhile to note that although it has
been long known in [9], that injecting Gaussian noise is
equivalent to penalizing the trace of Hessian matrix, to our
best knowledge, our approach is the first general method to
penalize the gradient of loss function w.r.t. the input in complex
models. Such regularization could be applied into various
machine learning model that contains gradient information.
In the following, we examine three special cases of this
family and show how this unified regularization framework
could contain another method [2].
B. Case p =∞
We show that in this case our method can be reduced
to the fast gradient sign method proposed in [2]. The worst
perturbation ǫ becomes:
ǫ =σ lim
p→∞
sign(∇L)( |∇L|‖∇L‖p∗
)
1
p−1 (5)
=σ sign(∇L)( |∇L|‖∇L‖
1
)0 (6)
(assuming |∇L| > 0) (7)
=σ sign(∇L) (8)
The corner case, where |∇L| = 0, defines sign(0) as 0.
Therefore, we can reduce our general method to a special case,
namely fast gradient sign method. The corresponding induced
regularization term is σ ‖∇L‖
1
. Mathematically speaking,
this regularization term appears to be unnatural, since the
gradient is not penalized in an isotropic way. This might
affect negatively the performance, especially when the data
is preprocessed to be Gaussian-like.
C. Case p = 1
This is another special case, where p = 1, and thus the
worst perturbation ǫ becomes:
ǫ =σ lim
p→1
sign(∇L)( |∇L|‖∇L‖p∗
)
1
p−1 (9)
=σ sign(∇L)( |∇L|‖∇L‖∞
)∞ (10)
Therefore,
ǫi =
{
σ, ∇Li = maxj Lj
0, otherwise
(11)
The intuition here is quite clear. Since we are constrained by
the sum of absolute value of all perturbations, it is intuitive
to put all of our “budgets” into one direction. However, the
induced regularization term ‖∇L‖∞ is not very appealing,
since it only penalizes gradient in one direction.
D. Case p = 2
As [10] have indicated that the extreme case of hyper
parameter p (p = 1 or p =∞) might not be the optimal setting,
we would like to introduce standard gradient regularization
where p = 2. Then, we will develop a second order Taylor
expansion analysis of this perturbation to provide further
theoretical insight into this particular case. First, let us write
down the formula for ǫ:
ǫ =σ sign(∇L)( |∇L|‖∇L‖
2
)1
=σ
∇L
‖∇L‖
2
(12)
We are now ready to compute the second order expansion. The
second order Taylor expansion of loss function is:
L(x+ ǫ) ≈L+ σ ‖∇xL‖2 +
1
2
ǫTHL(x)ǫ (13)
≈L+ σ ‖∇xL‖2 +
1
2
ǫTJy(x)HL(y)J
T
y (x)ǫ (14)
(by Lemma B.1)
=L+ σ ‖∇xL‖2 +
1
2
ǫT∇xL∇xLT ǫ (15)
=L+ σ ‖∇xL‖2 +
σ2
2
∇LT∇L∇LT∇L
‖∇L‖2
2
(16)
=L+ σ ‖∇xL‖2 +
σ2
2
∇LT∇L (17)
=L+ σ ‖∇xL‖2 +
σ2
2
Tr(∇L∇LT ) (18)
=L+ σ ‖∇xL‖2 +
σ2
2
Tr(Jy(x)HL(y)J
T
y (x))
(19)
(by Lemma B.1)
≈L+ σ ‖∇xL‖2 +
σ2
2
Tr(HL(x)) (20)
Therefore, the second order Taylor expansion resembled the
term induced by marginalizing over Gaussian noise.
Remark 2. It is possible to write down a generalized form
of second order regularization term as σ2
2
‖∇xL‖2p∗ . In thisform, it does not provide further insight, as it appears to be
duplication of the first order term in general.
E. Exact Solution Is Non-Trivial
As mentioned earlier, the original minmax problem (1)
is generally difficult to solve. However, it would be still of
interest to see whether the original minmax problem could be
solved without using approximation. It turns out that it is not
easy to achieve, even in the simplest case of a linear regression
mode. We show this in the following.
The optimization problem of finding the worst perturbation
in the linear regression model can be formulated as follows:
max
ǫ
‖t−Θ(x+ ǫ)‖ s.t. ‖ǫ‖p ≤ σ (21)
Fig. 1. Original input images from MNIST dataset
Fig. 2. Inputs perturbed by gradient perturbation with p = 2 and σ = 1
where t is the desired output, and Θ is the weight matrix.
Hence, we are maximizing a convex function, which is non-
trivial. One might hope that by applying the first order ex-
pansion, it could lead to a simple solution. However, while
this approximately solves the maximization problem, the min-
imization problem becomes non-convex due to the additional
regularization term. Therefore, it appears to be hard to obtain
exact solution in this very simple model.
F. Computational Cost
The computational cost of injecting such adversarial noise
comes from computing ǫ, which requires computing ∇xL
and a minimum overhead to convert ∇L into ǫ. A naive BP
approach to compute ǫ will roughly double the time cost of
the training. We implemented the algorithm using built in
functionality provided by [11].
III. VISUALIZATION AND INTERPRETATION OF GRADIENT
PERTURBATION
Traditionally, adversarial examples and corresponding per-
turbations are regarded as unintelligible to naked eyes [1], [2].
However, we will visualize our gradient perturbations in the
case of p = 2, and thus provide both physical intuition of
gradient perturbation and mathematical structure behind. The
physical intuition, in particular, could support the effectiveness
of gradient perturbation, and explain why adversarial examples
could generalize across models. The model used to generate
sample images in this section is a sigmoid network model
trained on the MNIST dataset [8].
A. Visualizing Adversarial examples
It has been demonstrated that adversarial examples are gen-
erated by imperceptible or unrecognizable perturbations [1],
[2]. However, we will show that in some cases we could
visualize those perturbations. Let us present randomly picked
samples from MNIST in Figure 1 and the perturbed images
by gradient perturbation with p = 2 and σ = 1 in Figure 2.
Indeed, at the first glance, we may conclude that the
perturbed examples are indistinguishable from the original
copies. However, let us take a closer look at the perturbations
in Figure 3 and Figure 4 by magnifying the perturbation with
a factor of 10: Although the magnified perturbations do not
still make much sense to naked human eye, the exaggerated
adversarial examples are presented in a more meaningful way
for the naked eye (see Figure 4). The perturbations have
changed the physical shapes of the objects in a perceptible way.
The number 2, 3, 6 are of special interest. The bottom right
corner of 2 has been erased and turned into 7; 3 is extended
into number 8; the 6 is the most interesting, where a part is
erased while another part is extended to become a 5.
Fig. 3. The corresponding perturbations magnified by a factor of 10
Fig. 4. Inputs perturbed by gradient perturbation with p = 2 and σ = 10
B. Mathematical Structure
In this subsection, we will try to interpret the above
phenomenon mathematically. To understand how those adver-
sarial examples are generated, let us decompose the gradient
perturbation ǫ when p = 2:
ǫ =σ
∇xL
‖∇xL‖2
(22)
=
σ
‖∇xL‖2
∇xL (23)
=
σ
‖∇xL‖2
∇yLJy(x) (24)
=
σ
‖∇xL‖2
(y − t)Jo(x) (25)
and where o is the input of the softmax layer for a typical
neural network, and t is the true label. Next, we need to
make the following assumption: the Jacobian matrix encodes
the local version of corresponding classes. Then, when the
prediction is concentrated on the correct output, (y−t) should
be small and negative. This corresponds to the cases like 0, 1,
and 9 in the previous section, where the perturbed examples
are still clear and correct. In the case of low predication
confidence, fuzzy perturbed examples could be generated. This
corresponds to the cases like 4, 5, 7, and 8. The most interesting
cases happen when there is a confusion between two classes.
That is to say, (y − t) contains two large components where
one component is positive and one negative. The negative
component corresponds to weak prediction of correct label,
and the positive component corresponds to most confused
wrong prediction. Images like 2, 3, and 6 in the previous
section are somewhat confusing when compared to the other
numbers. In such cases, an adversarial perturbation erases the
correct objects and injects the confused one.
Remark 3. In the above argument, we made the assumption
of the Jacobian’s ability to model the local space. This
assumption is reasonable, since neurons in several layers of
convolutional neural network correspond to certain natural
image statistics [12]. While such assumption might not hold
strictly in more complex data or data in other domains, there
are researches indicate that the encoding of such information
exist [13].
The above finding suggests that gradient perturbation
method works in a distinctive way from techniques like weight
decay or weight constraint method. It appears that gradient
perturbation adds regularization effects conditioned on the
performance of model in a particular instance. Therefore, it
will not over-regularize when unnecessary. This interpretation
is consistent with arguments made in [2].
C. Generalization of Adversarial Examples
The visualization tells us that image instances are actually
morphed into other classes in a very minimal form. Our
machine learning models are much more perceptive than
people in detecting such minor perturbations. Thus, the ability
of adversarial examples to generalize across different models
might come from meaningful changes in examples. A small
change towards a specific class will still be a change even
added in another instance.
This explanation is also in coherent with [2]. In their
framework, we can say that the generalization of adversarial
examples is due to the models’ resemblance of linear classifier,
and linear classifier could encode local semantic information
of images.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we will apply our proposed gradient pertur-
bation method on standard benchmarks including MNIST [8]
and CIFAR-10 [14]. In addition, we will test whether gradient
regularization could improve the models’ robustness. We will
mainly test the case for p = 2, which we refer to as standard
gradient regularization.
A. MNIST
The MNIST dataset [8] consists of 60,000 training exam-
ples and 10,000 testing examples. Each single example consists
of 28 × 28 greyscale images, which corresponds to digits
from 0 to 9. We rescale the inputs into the range of [0, 1]784,
and no further preprocessing is applied. We tested standard
perturbation regularization on three architectures: standard
sigmoid multilayer perceptron (MLP), Maxout network, and
Convolutional Maxout network [15]. The sigmoid MLP exper-
iments are conducted to investigate the utility of our method on
highly non-linear models, and the other two experiments are
designed to further verify whether our proposed framework
could obtain the state-of-the-art performance.
The sigmoid MLP has two hidden layers, and its pa-
rameters are chosen from [400,400], [600,600] and [800,800]
hidden units based on validation. Only norm constraint is used
as other means for regularization. The max norm is set to be
the square root of 15 as in [16]. The regularization parameter
σ is chosen from 0.1, 0.5, 1, and 2. The final architecture used
is two layers of 600 sigmoid units, and a softmax final layer. σ
is set to be 1. To fully utilize the training set, we followed [15]
to train the model on 50,000 examples first, and we record the
loss in the training set. Next, we train with a total of 60,000
examples until the last 10,0000 examples hit the same loss.
For the experiments based on Maxout networks, we have
engaged the model from Maxout paper [15] and applied
gradient regularization where σ = 1 as we have found from
experiments on sigmoid MLP. No other parameter setting is
tested. In addition, we tested the case of p = ∞ for the
Convolutional Maxout network, since it is not reported by [2].
We have found that setting σ = 0.1 leads to better results
than σ = 0.25, which is the best parameter for the non-
convolutional Maxout network according to [2].
2It is recently improved to 0.78% by applying adversarial idea on early
stopping, and changing architecture.
TABLE I. TESTING ERRORS ON PERMUTATION INVARIANT MNIST
DATASET WITHOUT DATA AUGMENTATION.
Models Test Error
Maxout + dropout 0.94 %
[15]
Sigmoid mlp + gradient p = 2 0.93 %
ReLu + dropout +gaussian 0.85 %
[17]
Maxout + dropout + gradient p =∞ 0.84 %2
[2]
DBM + dropout 0.79 %
[18]
Maxout + dropout + gradient p = 2 0.78 %
TABLE II. TESTING ERRORS ON MNIST DATASET WITHOUT DATA
AUGMENTATION. CONVOLUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE IS USED.
Models Test Error
Conv. Maxout + dropout 0.45 %
[15]
Conv. Maxout + dropout 0.41 %
+ gradient p =∞
Conv. Maxout + dropout 0.39 %
+ gradient p = 2
Conv. Kernel Network 0.39 %
[19]
In the permutation invariant version, we achieved 78 errors
among 10, 000 test samples in the case of p = 2. To our best
knowledge, this is the best result in this category even
with unsupervised pretraining if data are not augmented.
Also, gradient regularized old fashioned sigmoid MLP has
been shown to achieve 93 errors, which actually beats simple
Maxout networks with dropout training. This indicates that
even a highly nonlinear model such as sigmoid MLP could be
linear enough locally to benefit from gradient regularization.
We summarized our results and other related best results in
Table I.
In terms of the improvements on convolutional architecture,
our best result is obtained by standard gradient regularization.
We have achieved 39 errors on testing set, which ties with the
recently proposed sophisticated convolutional kernel network
described by [19]. To our best knowledge, no better results
are obtained without using of data augmentation like elastic
distortion. It appears that standard gradient regularization
outperforms fast gradient sign method in a consistent fashion,
especially if we consider that the σ parameter is not tuned for
Maxout network. We summarized the results in Table II.
B. CIFAR-10
The CIFAR-10 dataset [14] consists of 60,000 32 × 32
RGB images, corresponding to 10 categories of objects. There
are 50,000 training examples and 10,000 testing examples.
Again, we have followed the procedure in the Maxout pa-
per [15]. To quickly verify gradient regularization in a more
complex setting, we tested on a small convolutional maxout
network reported by [20], and can confirm again the im-
provement of our regularization technique. σ was set to be
1×
√
322×3
282
≈ 2 in this case, since the RBG image has more
dimensions. Similar to MNIST, the training has two stages,
TABLE III. TESTING ERRORS ON CIFAR-10 DATASET WITHOUT DATA
AUGMENTATION.
Models Testing Error
Conv. Maxout Small + dropout 14.05 %
[20] (40K)
Conv. Maxout Small + dropout 13.26 %
+Gradient p = 2 (40K)
Conv. Maxout Small + dropout 12.93 %
[20] (50K)
Conv. Maxout Small + dropout 12.28 %
+Gradient p = 2 (50K)
TABLE IV. TESTING ERRORS OF MNIST DATASET UNDER GAUSSIAN
NOISES
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
Models
Gaussian std 0 0.1 0.3
Conv. Maxout + dropout 0.45 % 0.76 % 20.17 %
Maxout + dropout 0.94 % 1.14 % 2.42 %
Conv. Maxout + dropout 0.39 % 0.44 % 14.36 %
+Gradient p = 2
Maxout + dropout 0.78 % 0.83 % 1.29 %
+Gradient p = 2
we compared the test error in the end of both stages. As can
be seen from Table III, our gradient regularization technique
improves the performance of this network.
C. Robustness
A recent theoretical study suggests there is a relationship
between adversarial examples and Gaussian noise [6], we have
used testing errors under Gaussian noise as a criterion to test
whether our regularization technique improves the models’
robustness against perturbations. We will also discuss the
relationship in V. We gather some data based on testing errors
on MNIST.
As can be seen from Table IV and V, our regulariza-
tion technique indeed improves the models’ ability to re-
sist perturbation. However, it is interesting to note that the
convolutional architecture seems to suffer more severe than
the standard Maxout network. This observation is consistent
with the data gathered from the ImageNet data set [1], where
researchers have shown that the operator norm is larger in
the convolutional architecture than fully connected networks.
This is however yet another indication that the randomness in
natural images is quite small even compare to those so called
imperceptible perturbations.
TABLE V. TESTING ERRORS OF CIFAR DATASET UNDER GAUSSIAN
NOISES
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
Models
Gaussian std 0 0.1 0.3
Conv. Maxout + dropout 13.08 % 13.37 % 16.88 %
Conv. Maxout + dropout 12.28 % 12.81 % 16.80 %
+Gradient p = 2
V. DISCUSSION
In this section, we will show how to exploit the proposed
unified theory and mainly discuss why adversarial examples
do not occur frequently in real data. Some of the following
analysis may not be strict enough but sufficient to provide
intuition and interpretations on certain properties of adversarial
examples.
By assuming the perturbation is caused by the Gaussian
noise, we will first analyze how the misclassification rates
of various learning models could be related to the minimum
perturbation. Here, the minimum perturbation is measured in
terms of its perturbation size that is able to change the models’
prediction on a certain example. After the establishment of the
relationship, we will be able to predict the probability or the
frequency that adversarial examples occur in real data. In order
to achieve these objectives, we will develop a mathematical
model by following two fundamental assumptions made in [2]:
the manifold where adversarial examples live is not special and
they mainly arise from local linear behavior.
More precisely, we assume that every data point is asso-
ciated with a Gaussian distribution: (x + η) ∼ N (x, σ2Id)
where σ is the standard deviation in every dimension, and Id
is an identity matrix of size d× d. Thus, adversarial examples
do not live in a region with particularly low probability as
contrary to suggestion from [1]. There are n directions to
generate effective adversarial examples, whose corresponding
minimum perturbations are respectively denoted as ai, and
direction ei = ai‖ai‖ for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. In order to generate
an adversarial example from η, we need to satisfy:
∃i, s.t. ηTei ≥ aTi ei (26)
Denote adversarial examples to occur as A, then we could
obtain a lower bound:
P (A) ≤
n∑
i=1
P (ηTei ≥ aTi ei) (27)
Since the Gaussian distribution is isotropic, P (ηTei ≥ aTi ei)
could be simplified into:
P (η0 ≥ ‖ai‖) (28)
and where η0 means η in an arbitrary axis. This essentially
means that given ‖ai‖, it will not increase the probability
of adversarial examples to occur by increasing dimension of
input space. To calculate the probability, we only need ‖ai‖.
To further simplify our formula, we assume all ‖ai‖’s are
equal, and just denote each ai as a. Hence, there are three
parameters in our model: n, ‖a‖ , σ, among which the size of
σ is controlled.
We could develop some qualitative intuitions first. To make
a fair comparison, we set that the mean distortion of adversarial
examples, as defined by [1], equal to the variance of the
Gaussian distribution. In other words, we set σ2 = ‖a‖
2
2
d
, so
that our model only depends on the number of directions n
and the dimension of input d. Then, based on Equation (28),
we have:
P (A) ≤ nP (η0
σ
≥
√
d) (29)
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Fig. 5. Histogram of minimum perturbation in a single layer softmax model
with regularization parameter λ = 1e− 4. Histograms of other regularization
parameters are of the same shape but different in scale
Since the event denotes η0 to be
√
d standard deviation away
from the mean, the probability of the event to occur shrinks
exponentially. Therefore, while high dimensionality makes it
possible to find a direction such that the model prediction
would be changed, it also provides protection in a probabilistic
sense that such prediction change could be unlikely.
In the next subsection, we will concretely take the MNIST
data as one real example to make further analysis. The image
pixels used in the following analysis are all scaled into [0,1].
Following [1], we will conduct our analysis based on the
simple softmax model, which is of linear nature.
A. Estimating Misclassification Rate under Gaussian Noise
This subsection mainly aims at verifying our linear analyz-
ing framework and gathering insights from empirical observa-
tions. To get a reasonable numerical estimation of misclassi-
fication rate, it is not enough to use the average of minimum
perturbation ‖a‖
2
, instead we have to take the distribution
of minimum perturbation into consideration. There are two
reasons for this: (1) the minimum perturbations of a small
value have a major impact on the probability that adversarial
examples occur, and (2) the minimum perturbation skews
towards small values as seen in Figure 5. We approximate
the distribution of ‖a‖ by a Gaussian distribution Na(µa, σ2a).
We will then have:
P (A) ≤nP (η0 ≥ ‖a‖) (30)
=nP (η0 − ‖a‖ ≥ 0) (31)
The summation of two Gaussian random variables, denoted by
δ ≡ η0−‖a‖, is Gaussian, whose mean and variance are −µa
and σ2+σ2a respectively. Then, we have the probability related
to a cumulative distribution function of a Gaussian variable:
P (A) ≤ nP (δ ≥ 0) (32)
If we further assume the smallest perturbation in one certain
direction dominates the predicated probability, we can roughly
set n = 1.3 Then, the remaining task is to get an estimation of
µa and σ2a. Following the linear view of adversarial examples,
we perform a line-search in the direction of gradient ∇xL to
find the minimum perturbation needed to change the prediction
from correct to wrong. We have gathered the statistics from
3Such assumption may be less strict, which is however simple and useful
to get clear insight into the theory.
TABLE VI. MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF THE MINIMUM
PERTURBATIONS FOR SOFTMAX MODELS ON MNIST TRAINING DATASET
Models mean standard deviation
Softmax λ = 1e − 4 0.2744 0.1511
Softmax λ = 1e − 2 0.4722 0.2531
Softmax λ = 1 1.2718 0.6654
TABLE VII. ACUTAL MISCLASSIFICATION RATE ON MNIST UNDER
THE PERTURBATION OF GAUSSIAN NOISE
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
Models
Gaussian std 0 0.1 0.3
Softmax λ = 1e− 4 6.02 % 11.99 % 40.07 %
Softmax λ = 1e− 4 6.29 % 8.22 % 22.44 %
Softmax λ = 1e− 4 8.93 % 9.16 % 11.33 %
TABLE VIII. MISCLASSIFICATION RATE THEORETICALLY ESTIMATED
BY (33) ON MNIST UNDER THE PERTURBATION OF GAUSSIAN NOISE
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
Models
Gaussian std 0 0.1 0.3
Softmax λ = 1e− 4 6.02 % 12.12 % 25.47 %
Softmax λ = 1e− 2 6.29 % 10.16 % 17.01 %
Softmax λ = 1 8.93 % 11.61 % 12.63 %
softmax models, and summarized the results in Table VI. Note
that these statistics are obtained under the training set (with
sufficiently large number of samples) so as to get a statistically
reliable conclusion. Similar inspection can be derived if the test
data were used.
As can be seen from Table VI, a larger regularization
parameter corresponds to better robustness. To estimate the
misclassification rate under different levels of Gaussian noises,
we first need to obtain the misclassification rate without
noise. With the further assumption that misclassification is not
corrected by noise, the predicated misclassification rate can be
calculated theoretically as:
P (miss) + (1− P (miss))× P (δ ≥ 0) (33)
Given the perturbation under the Gaussian noise, we can get
the actual misclassification rates in MNIST and also estimate
such rate theoretically using Equation (33). These results are
listed in Table VII and Table VIII respectively.
As can be seen by comparing Table VII and Table VIII, the
misclassification rate estimated from our probability model fits
well the actual rate as obtained from empirical experiments.
Although these numerical results do not match exactly as
seen in Table VII and Table VIII, the qualitative changes of
the predications and actual results are fairly consistent under
different levels of Gaussian noises.
Note that, within the linear view of adversarial examples,
we have made two major assumptions in the previous analysis.
First, we adopt the most dominant direction to estimate the
misclassification rate. This may lead to underestimation of
misclassification, since other directions are neglected. Second,
we approximate the distribution of minimum perturbation by
a Gaussian distribution. This may lead to overestimation of
misclassification rate in the case of no noise. Table VI indicates
that standard deviation of minimum is roughly half of the mean
Fig. 6. Images corrupted by Gaussian noise with σ = 0.01
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Fig. 7. Histogram of minimum perturbation in a single layer softmax model
with regularization parameter λ = 1e− 4. Region beyond 0.1 is filtered.
in a consistent fashion. Then, even without Gaussian noise, the
calculation yields roughly P (A) ≈ 3%. The reason behind this
is that the actual distribution is only supported in the positive
region, but Gaussian distribution is not. This simplification
does not have a major impact when σ is large, and our results
agree with this. However, to estimate P (A) when σ is small,
we may need to readjust our approximation.
B. Estimating the Probability of Adversarial Examples
To estimate the probability that adversarial examples occur
in reality, we need to estimate the randomness in natural
images and the distribution of the minimum perturbations. This
is especially necessary when the perturbation is sufficiently
small, i.e., close to 0, since the overestimation occurs in this
case as indicated in the previous subsection. In the following,
we intend to choose a σ that is sufficiently large, yet is hardly
perceptible. We first illustrate some examples from MNIST
dataset in Figure 6, where σ = 0.01.
In Figure 6 , such noise is imperceptible even with a
close examination, and this is not the case for significantly
larger σ. We observe that the distribution of the minimum
perturbation appears to be linear when it is close to zero
as seen in Figure 7.4 In light of this, we could assume
the probability density is linear around 0 with respect to
the minimum perturbation. After gathering statistics from the
graph and some algebras, we can predicate the increase of
misclassification rate in theory (based on our model) for a
perturbation caused by Gaussian noise with σ = 0.01. The
percentage of such additional misclassification is calculated
theoretically and listed in Table IX. We also list the actual
additional misclassification, which was obtained empirically
from experiments. Note that, according to the above analysis
and assumptions, these additional misclassified samples can be
regarded as adversarial examples that occur naturally, when a
perturbation is given by Gaussian noise. As seen in Table IX,
these numbers are of sufficiently small both theoretically
(under column “Predicated) and empirically (under column
“Actual”), meaning that the probability of adversarial examples
is quite small. Therefore, the claim that adversarial examples
4The space in the figure is caused by steps in line search.
TABLE IX. ACTUAL AND PREDICATED PERCENTAGE OF ADDITIONAL
MISCLASSIFICATION RATE CAUSED BY THE PERTURBATION OF GAUSSIAN
NOISE WITH σ = 0.01 ON MNIST
Models Actual Predicated
Softmax λ = 1e− 4 0.07 % 0.04 %
Softmax λ = 1e− 2 0.01 % 0.02 %
Softmax λ = 1 0.01 % 0.01 %
could endanger our machine learning models seems to some-
what over cautious, since its natural occurrence is supposed to
be rare and negligible comparing to classification errors of our
models. This is both verified theoretically and empirically in
the above analysis.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a unified framework,
which aims at building robust models against adversarial
examples. We have derived a family of gradient regulariza-
tion techniques, which could be extensively used in various
machine learning models. In particular, a special case has a
second order interpretation, which approximately marginalized
over Gaussian noise. We explained the adversarial examples’
ability to generalize across models by visualizing its effects,
which had been previously thought to be unrecognizable. This
visualization, in turn, supplement our regularization technique
with physical meaning.
While the linear view appears to be plausible and fruitful,
so far, it needs more empirical support. To be more concrete,
manifold hypothesis suggests data residue in a low dimensional
manifold in the space. This, however, suggests that it is always
possible to leave the manifold by slight change, since there are
extra dimension around every point in the manifold, and the
fact supports the hypothesis. Theoretically, a low dimensional
manifold has measure of zero. This makes the number analogy
made by [2] almost literally true, but with adversarial exam-
ples being irrational numbers. In reality, however, data float
around the manifold. Thus, geometrically, we could check the
implication of linear view by associating errors induced by
Gaussian noises and the minimum perturbation length. Our
primary work suggests that it would require distribution of
minimum perturbation length to account for the actual errors.
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APPENDIX A
SOLVING ǫ
Since L(x) is independent of ǫ. Our problem is
max
ǫ
∇xLT ǫ s.t. ‖ǫ‖p ≤ σ (34)
Clearly, the optimal ǫ would have a norm of σ, otherwise, we
can normalize ǫ to get a greater loss. Therefore, we are set to
solve
max
ǫ
∇xLT ǫ s.t. ‖ǫ‖p = σ (35)
This could be solved by standard Lagrangian multiplier
method, where f(ǫ) ≡ ∇xLT ǫ, and g(ǫ) ≡ ‖ǫ‖p = σ. Set
∇f(ǫ) = λ∇g(ǫ), we have
∇f(ǫ) = λ∇g(ǫ) (36)
∇xL = λ ǫ
p−1
p(
∑
i ǫ
p
i )
1− 1
p
(37)
∇xL = λ
p
(
ǫ
σ
)p−1 (38)
∇xL
p
p−1 = (
λ
p
)
p
p−1 (
ǫ
σ
)p (39)
(40)
Sum over two sides
∑
∇xL
p
p−1 =
∑
(
λ
p
)
p
p−1 (
ǫ
σ
)p (41)
‖∇L‖p∗p∗ = (
λ
p
)p
∗ ∗ 1 (42)
(
λ
p
) = ‖∇L‖p∗ (43)
Combine (38) and (43), it is easy to see
ǫ = σ sign(∇L)( |∇L|‖∇L‖p∗
)
1
p−1 (44)
APPENDIX B
LEMMA
Let vector y be the output of model, i.e. y = y(x).
Correspondingly, we have vector t as the desired output.
We have N as the length of y, where N is the number of
classes in a classification task. GN(x) ≡ Jy(x)HL(y)JTy (x)
is Gaussian-Newton matrix, which is an approximation of
Hessian matrix of L w.r.t. x [23]. The Jy(x) is the Jacobian
matrix of y w.r.t. x, and HL(y) is the Hessian matrix of L
w.r.t. y.
Lemma B.1. Given L = −∑Ni=1 ti log(yi), and ∃l ∈
1, 2, , . . . , N s.t. ∀i ∈ 1, 2, , . . . , N, i = δli. We have
∇xL∇xLT = Jy(x)HL(y)JTy (x).
Proof: First, by chain rule, we have ∇xL = Jy(x)∇yL.
By cancellation of Jy(x) on both sides, it suffices to show
∇yL∇yLT = HL(y). Now, let us calculate the gradient:
∂L
∂yi
= − ti
yi
= −δil
yi
(45)
Then, compute the out product:(∇yL∇yLT )ij = δilδjlyiyj . This
means all the off-diagonal items are zeros, and only one term
left in the diagonal, which is (∇yLT∇yL)ll = 1y2
l
. Let us
compute Hessian matrix:
∂2L
∂yj∂yi
= − ∂
∂yj
δil
yi
=
δilδij
y2i
(46)
Hence, HL(y) also have only one diagonal term, which is
(HL(y))ll =
1
y2
l
. Therefore, we have the equality as desired.
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